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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Respondents, Russell 
Acton, Andrew Acton and Carol E. Acton, (hereafter referred to 
as the "Actons") justifiably relied upon misrepresentations, 
made either mistakenly or recklessly, by defendant-respondent 
ERA prior to the Actons' purchase of a small building and 
surrounding property in Cedar City, Utah. The misrepresenta-
tions concerned the legality of a water hookup on the 
property. As a result of ERA's misrepresentations, the Actons 
purchased d building ana property with no legal water hookup on 
it, and suosegucntly le3rned that it would cost the Actons 
almost as much as the purchase price to acquire a le0al water 
hooKup. The Actons sought to have the real estate contract 
with defendants-respondents and cross-appellants J. B. Deliran 
and Gerald House rescinded and recover from them all payments 
the Actons have made on the property since they purchased it. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following a jury trial on the Actons' claims for 
rescission based upon fraudulent misrepresentations and mutual 
mistake, the jury found that the real estate contract between 
the Actons and J. B. Deliran and Gerald House should be upheld, 
and dismissed the Actons' claims against J. B. Deliran, House 
and ERA. The trial court denied the Actons' motions for a 
directed verdict anc judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and 
entered a judgment in accordance with the jury verdict. 
Subsequently, the trial court awarded the Actons $16,450 in 
damages as a result of J.B. Deliran and House's failure to 
provide the Actons with access to the property at issue. The 
trial court had determined, as a matter of law, that access was 
part and parcel of the land sale contract between the Actons 
and J. B. Deliran and House. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Actons assert that tho "Statement of Facts" set 
forth in their original brief filed in this appeal is a 
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succinct ano obJective recapitulation of the factual record in 
this case. However, pursuant to Rule 75 (b) (2) of the Utah 
Rules of :::ivil Proceoure, the Actons will respond to ERA's 
"Statement of Facts." 
On pp. 3-4 of ERA's brief, ERA discusses the purchase 
of the Yates property by J. B. Deliran, and then states that 
while the Yates listing indicated that water was in the 
building on the property, the Deliran listing (which the Actons 
claimed at trial was never shown to them until after the 
closing on the property -- Trial Transcript ("Tr.") at 203-204, 
237-2d3, 291-292) indicated that city water was not available. 
Then ERA states that Deliran and the Actons entered into an 
Earnest 11one1 Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement. It is 
important for the Court to note that the Earnest lloney Receipt 
a11. Ofter to Purchase Agreement did not indicate if city water 
was or was not provided on the property (Tr. at 358-359). 
In their next paragraph, on p. 4, ERA states that 
Andrew Acton saw the Yates listing the first time he saw the 
property, then visited the property again in June of 1981, 
after the property had been purchased by J.B. Deliran. ERA 
neglects to mention that, at that second visit, even though the 
property had been purchased by J. B. Deliran and relisted by 
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J.B. Deliran with ERA, the ERA sales agent showed Mr. Acton 
the same Yates listing he had seen on his first visit to the 
property (Tr. at 184-185, 313, 344). 
On p. 5 of their brief, ERA states that "[P]laintiffs 
claim there is some dispute as to what Behunin told Plaintiffs 
concerning the availability of water . The Actons have 
never claimed that there was any dispute as to what Behunin 
said. His deposition testimony, and his trial testimony, are 
very clear. ERA has pulled out selected portions of his trial 
testimony to give the impression that Behunin, the City 
building inspector, put the Actons on notice that there was 
some problem with the legality of the water flowing from the 
frost-free spigot on the property. In fact, Behunin's 
testimony clearly shows that Behunin and the Actons were merely 
talking about a water meter hookup, a device which measures 
water usage, and which would cost around $1,000 (Tr. at 240) 
They were not discussing the legality of a water pipeline that 
would bring water to the property (Tr. at 407-409). In 
particular, Behunin states that he doesn't recall saying 
anything to the Actons at the time of their meeting "other than 
they would have to get a meter" (Tr. at 409). ERA then quotes 
Behunin's testimony under cross-examination by all 
Behunin says is that he told the Actons that they needed to get 
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a water meter, and to do that they would have to see Bud Bauer, 
the superintendent of the Cedar City Municipal Water System 
(Tr. at 420). It is important to note that Behunin reiterated 
that he did not tell the Actons that the water connection was 
i 11ega1 (Tr . at 4 2 2) . 
On p. 6 of their brief, ERA states that the survey 
prepared by David Grimshaw makes reference to a sewer 
connection location but "fails to indicate that a water meter 
was discovered during the course of the survey." Once again, 
even though this is a "Statement of Facts," ERA is arguing, by 
implication, that the Actons should have realized that there 
was a problem with the water because a water meter was not 
discovered during the course of the survey work. As Grimshaw 
clearly testifiec at trial, he was not being paid to look for a 
water meter, and therefore his survey failed to mention that a 
water meter was or was not discovered during the course of his 
survey (Tr. at 488, 492). 
ERA then spends almost seven pages quoting or 
paraphrasing trial testimony. In effect, ERA has devoted most 
of its "Statement of Facts" to its argument. 
With regard to Grimshaw's testimony, quoted on pp. 7-8 
of ERA's brief, argues that the Actons were on notice about 
a water problem prior to the closing of the property sale in 
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this case because Grimshaw testified that Wayne Smith told 
Russell Acton of a problem with the water on the doy of the 
survey, mentioned above. Grimshaw's testimony is specifically 
and categorically disputed by Russell Acton's testimony at 
trial. Russell Acton recalls no discussion, at any time when 
he was standing with Wayne Smith and Grimshaw, about.any water 
problems, or any water rights of Wayne Smith, notwithstanding 
the implication ERA tries to draw at pp. 10-11 of their brief. 
Russell testified that his discussion with Smith on the day of 
the survey solely concerned the boundary lines and the access 
problem on the property. Russell further testified that he 
spoke for only ten or fifteen minutes with Mr. Smith, out of 
the several hours Russell was involved in the survey. He also 
said that there were times when he was 25-30 feet away from 
Smith and Grimshaw when they were talking together, and he was 
not involved in, nor could hear, their conversation (Tr. at 
496-497). Russell's testimony also serves to specifically and 
cate3orically repudiate the testimony of Smith, quoted by ERA 
in their brief at pr. 9-10. Smith also undercut his own 
credibility when he testified, in response to cross-
examination, that he couldn't recall the exact times he talked 
with the Actons about the water problem, and that those times 
could have been after the closing date on property (Tr. at 
471, 473-474). 
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At pp. 11-13, ERA paraphrases, and then quotes, the 
testimony of llancy Hale, ar1other salesperson for ERA. They 
paraphrase her testimony about what she assumes Behunin told 
the Actons at their meeting at the property, discussed above. 
Such assumptions were proven false at trial by Behunin's 
specific testimony, previously cited herein. Her testimony 
about her "dialogue" with Russell Acton is quoted in order to 
imply to the Court that he didn't say anything in response to 
her questions about the illegal hookup because he agreed with 
her recapitulation of events. All of Russell's testimony prior 
to that in the trial, and subsequently in rebuttal, refute that 
implicalion. 
All the testimony paraphrased or quoted by ERA in 
their "Statement of Facts" is disputed by the Actons. Not only 
does it ditfer from the Actons' "Statement of Facts," which is 
supported by references to the record, but the Actons' 
refutation of ERA' s "Statement of Facts" is supported by 
references to the record. 
I. 
ARGUMEtJT 
7he evidence does not support the jury verdict 
in the trial of this case which affirmed the 
contract between the Actons and J.B. Deliran 
and House, and the trial court should have 
grantee the Actons' motion for a directed 
or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
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ERA makes the same argument in § 1 of Its Argument as 
in § 2 of its Argument. It claims that there was evidence at 
trial upon which the jury could base its decision to affirm the 
land sale contract between the Actons and J. E. Deliran and 
House, and therefore the trial court acted properly in refusing 
to grant the Actons' motions for a directed verdict or for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In response to this 
argument, and in the interests of judicial and financial 
economy, the Actons reargue and incorporate by reference herein 
their argument, supported by extensive references to the 
record, in their original brief in this appeal, at pp. 5-20. 
The Actons specifically note that, at pp. 18-19 of their 
original brief in this appeal, they discussed the case cited by 
ERA, Kaer v. Mayfair 11arkets, 19 Ut.2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 
(1967). The Actons reiterate that the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that the party against whom a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is made is entitled only to 
"reasonable inferences" (emphasis added). Kaer v. Mayfair 
Markets, 431 P.2d at 570. 
As stated in the Actons' original brief in this 
appeal, the testimony of Wayne Smith, upon whom all 
defendancs-respondents rely, is so vague and uncertain that it 
is incompetent. No reasonable inferences can be drawn from his 
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Also, the testimony of David Grimshaw, the surveyor 
upon whom all defendants-respondents also rely in their briefs, 
was not specific with regard to his recollections, and the 
Actons submit that reasonable inferences cannot be drawn from 
his testimony, either. 
II. ERA was not a party to the Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement 
executed by the Actons and J. B. Deliran 
and House, and cannot seek attorney's 
fees under that Agreement. 
ERA attempts to prove, by way of some novel arguments, 
tnat they were a party to the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase Agreement executed by the Actons and J.B. Deliran 
and House, and because that contract was affirmed by the jury 
in the trial of this case, they are entitled to attorney's fees 
based upon the language in the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase Agreement, as set forth in their brief at p. 17. 
ER,'s first puint is that, in response to the Actons' 
Complaint to rescind the contract, and in order to retain the 
sales commission paid to them by J.B. Deliran and House, ERA 
had to come into Court to enforce the contract. However, ERA 
was not made a party in this lawsuit because they were a party 
to the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement, 
but rather because their salesperson had made 
misrepresentations to the Actons concerning water on the 
prorerty. The 'ctons brou3ht ERA into the lawsuit on the 
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theories of fraudulent misrepresentation or mutual mistake, not 
breach of contract. See, Actons' Second Amended Complaint, 
March 30, 1982. Just because, during the course of their 
defense of the action, the posture of ERA was to enforce the 
contract does not make them privy to the contract. The hollow 
nature of Era's theory is shown by ERA's inability to cite any 
case law in support of their contention. Indeed, agency case 
law holds that, even though an agent's actions (for which he or 
she receives a commission) help bring about the execution of a 
sales contract, that agent is not a party to a lawsuit in which 
the principal seeks to enforce a contract. Loftis v. LaSalle, 
434 P.2d 221, 225 (Okla. 1967); Mitten v. lleston, 615 P.2d 
60,61 (Colo. App. 1980). 
The next theory offered by ERA in support of their 
quest for attorney's fees, and one even more incredible than 
the first theory, boils down as follows. If ERA was an agent 
of J.B. Deliran, as the trial court found as a matter of law, 
it must have merged with J. B. Deliran, was "one in the same" 
(ERA's brief at p. 19) as J.B. Deliran, and therefore could 
claim the same legal rights as J. B. Deliran. Clearly, agents 
don't have the same legal rights as their principals. Yet ERA 
is now trying to claim the legal privileges that only accrue to 
the principal in an agency-principal relationship, even though 
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they argueo throughout the trial that they were the agent of J. 
B. Deliran and could not be legally accountable for their 
actions undertaken within the scope of their employment by J.B. 
Deliran. 
ERA then cites Usinger v. 280 Or.751, 572 
P.2d 1018 (1977), claiming that it supports ERA's position, 
though that position is hardly clear from ERA's brief. In the 
Usinger case, there was a dispute between the parties about the 
of the contract. The plaintiff brought suit seeking 
specific performance. The defendant claimed that plaintiff 
failed to live up to some of the terms of the contract, and 
therefore the defendant was released from its duty to perform 
under the contract. The court in Usinger found for the 
defendant and granted it attorney's fees. However, unlike in 
the instant case, the legal theories of both parties in the 
Usinger case were grounded upon the validity of the land sale 
contract at issue. Since both parties felt that the contract 
was valid, both parties were bound by the attorney's fee clause 
in that contract. Not so in the instant case. The Actons 
sought rescission of the contract. The Usinger case cannot be 
used to support ERA's argument for attorney's fees. 
ERA bases its claim for attorney's fees upon the 
wording in tne Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
Agreement at lines 47-48: 
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If either party fails so to do, he agrees to 
pay all expenses of enforcing this 
Agreement, or of any right arising out of 
the breach thereof, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(Brief of at 17.) This argument assumes that ERA is a 
party to the Agreement, a claim disputed by the Actons and 
discussed earlier in this brief. The meaning of the cited 
clause is that if either party fails to carry out their 
obligations under the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase Agreement, the other party has a right to collect 
attorney's fees for the enforcement of the Agreement. It is 
the position of the Actons, and this position was supported by 
the trial court in tne post-trial hearings in this case (Tr. of 
March 3, 1983 hearing at 88-89), that none of the 
defendants-respondents were entitled to attorney's fees because 
their defense of the Actons' action for rescission of the 
contract or damages resulting from tortious misrepresentations 
was not an enforcement of the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase Agreement required by some breach by the Actons. 
All payments were current on the sale of the property and the 
Actons had fulfilled all other obligations under the Agreement. 
The Actons have been unable to find any cases, state 
or federal, with facts similar to the instant one; that is, 
where a party unsuccessfully sought to rescind a real property 
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sale (the property being pursuant to an Earnest Money 
Agreement that included an attorney's fees clause) and the 
prevailing deiendant claimed attorney's fee:. The courts 
generally do not grant contractually-mandated attorney's fees 
in cases where the party seeking rescission, or a disaffirmance 
of the entire contract, prevails. BLT Investment v. Snow, 586 
P.2d 450, 458 (Ut. 1978); Bodenhamer v. Patterson, 278 Or. 367, 
563 P.2d 1212, 1218 (1977). Similarly, where a party brings an 
action to enforce a contract, e.g. specific performance or 
foreclosure, the courts have granted contractually-mandated 
attorney's fees. Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Ut. 1977); 
Anaheim Co. v. Elliot, 45 Or. App. 597, 609 P.2d 382 (1930). 
In tne instant case, however, the Actons initiated the 
litigation 2nd sought rescission of the land sale contract, or 
damages for tort1ous misrepresentations. They did not pursue a 
remedy in the nature of enforcing the contract. They felt they 
had been defrauded, or at the very least, led to believe there 
was water on their newly-purchased property. 
It seems manifestly unfair to allow any of the 
defendants-respondents attorney's fees for defending 
successfully against a rescission action when the Actons, as a 
matter of law, would nol have received attorney's fees had they 
preva1led. Individtials who >1ant to bring rescission suits 
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already face the prospect of their own attorney's fees and, of 
course, the usual risk of loss of the suit. The risk of paying 
a defendant's attorney's fees as well will have a chilling 
eftect on these individuals' exercise of their rights to seek 
redress in the courts. 
Other courts have acted to prevent such unilateral 
unfairness. In United States v. Peter Kiewit and Sons' Co., 
235 F. Supp. 500 (D. Alaska 1964), an insurance company sued a 
contractor under a federal statute to recover premiums for 
worker's compensation insurance. The statute granted 
attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs, but not to defendants 
who defended successfully. The defendants argued that they 
should, as a matter of equity and fairness, be granted 
attorney's fees. The court agreed with tneir argument. While 
Peter Kiewit and Sons' Co. is the converse of the instant case, 
the principles of equity and justice underlying that court's 
decision are relevant and applicable. See also, Devore v. 
Bostrom, 632 P.2d 832, 836-837 (Ut. 1981) (Stewart, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
The Actons pursued a claim of rescission, knowing that 
they would not be granted attorney's fees if they won. They 
probably would not have brought this lawsuit if they knew they 
risked losing not only the difference monetarily between the 
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property with water on it and without water, and their own 
attorney's fees, but also defendants-respondents' attorney's 
fees. The issue of attorney's fees under the instant set of 
facts is one of first impression for this Court. With no 
precedent to guide it, the Court must look to a sense of 
justice and fairness in making its decision. The Actons submit 
that such a sense requires that ERA's appeal for attorney's 
fees be denied. 
III. The trial court was correct in denying 
attorne/'S tees to ERA pursuant to 
§ 73-27-56, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended). 
ERA argues at p. 21 of their brief that the trial 
court should have awarded them attorney's fees on the basis of 
§ 78-27-56, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), the Utah Code 
provision providing statutory non-contractual rights to 
attorney's fees where a court determines that an action or 
defense to a law suit was without merit and was not brought or 
asserted in good faith. The gravamen of ERA's argument is that 
nothing in the prayer of the Actons' Second Amended Complaint 
could be effectively granted against ERA. ERA argues that, 
even if the jury in the trial of this matter had found for the 
Actons, the trial court coulc not have ordered ERA to rescind 
the land sale contract at issue, nor could it have assessed 
against ERA, because ERA was not a party to the 
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contract. By the way, it is significant that ERA goes back to 
this argument, when earlier in its brief it was claiming it was 
in fact party to the contract. 
What ERA' s argument misses is that the Ac tons, in 
their Second Amended Complaint, sought rescission or, in the 
alternative, damages. However, the damages sought by the 
Actons were not damages for breach of contract, but rather 
damages for tortious misrepresentations. An examination of all 
of the pleadings and of all the transcripts of the hearings in 
this case clearly shows that, by the time all the parties got 
to the trial in this matter, the main issues for the jury to 
decide were those of fraudulent misrepresentation or mutual 
mistake. At the pre-trial hearing in this case, held in Cedar 
City on August 19, 1982, one of the main discussions before the 
court was ERA's motion to dismiss itself from the Complaint. 
Throughout the discussion at the pre-trial hearing, ERA 
admitted that they had exposure under the Actons' fraudulent 
misrepresentation cause of action. The jury would have to 
decide whether any representations made by ERA's salesperson 
were within the scope of her employQent by J. B. Deliran and 
House, or were outside the scope, thereby making ERA liable for 
any damages caused by those representations. (Tr. of August 
19, 1982 pre-trial hearing at pp. 41-45, 66). As a result of 
-16-
this discussion at the hearing, the trial court at 
that time denied ERA's Motion to Dismiss. The jury could have 
found for the Actons against ERA and assessed damages against 
EPA for fraudulent misrepresentations. ERA' s argument that the 
Actons' claims were therefore without merit and not brought in 
good faith must fail. 
Tne other point made by EFA is that, since the trial 
court ruled as a matter ot law that ERA was the agent of J.B. 
Deliran and House, any questions as to liability on the part of 
ERA were resolved and ERA never should have been a party in the 
case. What ERA fails to tell this court is that the trial 
court made that ruling during jury instructions arguments by 
all counsel at the end of the trial in this case. ERA's 
argument that it was determined to be an agent as a matter of 
law and thereforL cannot be liable for any misrepresentations 
the jury might have found cannot support its theory that it is 
entitled to attorney's fees under § 78-27-56, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953, as amended). 
\i i t h r "g a rrl t o C ad y v . Joh n son , 6 7 1 P • 2 d 14 9 ( U t. 
1983), such case undermines ERA's argument that they are 
entitled to attorney's teoE. Jn that case, this court vacated 
a trial court judgment of attorney's fees under § 78-27-56, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) on the grounds that, while 
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plaintiffs' case was without merit, it was not brought in bad 
faitn. In the instant case, this court need not even address 
the issue of bad faith, because, clearly, the Actons' case had 
merit. In the Cady v. Johnson case, both of plaintiffs' causes 
of action were dismissed before or at trial. In the instant 
case, none of the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed oefore or 
at trial. The claims had merit. Cady v. Johnson cannot 
support ERA's argument for attorney's fecG. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the position of the Actons in this brief, as it 
has been in their original brief in this appeal, ana their 
responding brief to defendants-respondents J. B. Deliran and 
House's appeal brief, that the evidence at the trial of this 
matter did not support the jury verdict, which affirmed the 
l3nd sale contract between the Actons and J. B. Del1ran and 
House. For the reasons set forth in those preceeding briefs, 
the Actons that the trial court erred in not granting 
the Actons' Motion for a Directed Verdict or Judgment 
Notwithstanding tne Verdict. 
The Actons further submit that ERA has not in any way 
proven that it is entitled to attorney's fees in this matter. 
They were not a party to the Earnest Money Receipt 2nd Ofter to 
Purchase Agreement executed by the Actons and J. B. Deliran and 
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Huuse, so they cannot seek attorney's fees pursuant to that 
contractual provision. The lawsuit brought by the Actons 
culminated in a three-day jury trial. At no time before or 
during the trial were any of the Actons' causes of actions 
disr.iissed. Therefore, ERA cannot seek attorney's fees for this 
ma:ter under the statutory provision of § 78-27-56, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953, as amended). 
Respectfully subr.iitted this 22nd day of March, 1384. 
PRINCE, GELD ZAHLER 
By 
Jeffrey; ot" tt 
A.tturnEjy¢ tJ,r Pl intiffs-Appellants 
and Crdis-
Russell, Andrew and Carol E. A.cton 
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MAILING 
On this __fj_day of March, 1984, I hereby certify that 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing RESPONDING BRIEF OF 
PLAITNIFFS-APPELLAN:;>S AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS RUSSELL ?\CTOtJ, 
ANDREW ACTON AND CAROLE. ACTON, to the following parties of 
record: 
2861G 
Patrick Fenton, Esq. 
154 North Main 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Hans Q. Chamberlain, Esq. 
110 North Main, G 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
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